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Abstract. In 1978 the powerful and practical RSA public-key
scheme was produced. It is the most widely used public-key cryp-
tosystem. Its security is based on the intractability of the integer
factorization problem and on solving the RSA problem of …nding
the ¡root of an integer  modulo  where  is the product of
large distinct primes. El-Kassar at al., modi…ed the RSA public-
key encryption scheme from the domain of natural integers, Z, to
two principal ideal domains, namely the domain of Gaussian inte-
gers, Z[], and the domain of the rings of polynomials over …nite
…elds,  [], by extending the arithmetic needed for the modi…ca-
tions to these domains. In this work we implement the classical
and modi…ed RSA digital signature algorithms to compare and to
test their functionality, reliability and security. To test the security
of the algorithms we implement attack algorithms to solve the fac-
torization problem in ZZ[] and  [] After factorization is found,
the RSA problem could be solved by …nding the private key using
the extended Euclidean algorithm.
1. Introduction
Digital signatures are strong tools applied in order to achieve the se-
curity services of authentication (proof of identity of the sender), data
integrity (detection of changes to the message) and non-repudiation
(prevention of denial of sending the information).They are digital coun-
terpart of handwritten signatures that can be transmitted over a com-
puter network. Only the sender can make the signature, but other
people can easily recognize as belonging to the sender. The sender
produce a signature consisting of a number associating a message (in
digital form) with a secret key. This signature is intended to be unique
and it does not necessarily require that a message be encrypted but
must be veri…able.The concept of a digital signature was introduced
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in 1976 by Di¢e and Hellman. They published their landmark paper
”New Directions in Cryptography” [2].The RSA signature is the …rst
method scheme discovered and it is the most popular approved as a
standard system and the most widely used. It is named after its inven-
tors Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. The signature works in Z where
 is the product of two large primes  and , and its security is based
on the intractability of the integer factorization problem, on the RSA
problem and on the selection of the redundancy function. Ihe RSA
problem, see [11], is the problem of …nding an integer  such that 
´  (mod ), where  is a product of two distinct large odd primes 
and ,  is a positive random integer such that gcd( ( ¡ 1)( ¡ 1))
= 1, and an integer . That is, the RSA problem is that of …nding 
roots of an integer  modulo a composite integer .
The classical signature schemes, such as RSA, ElGamal and Rabin
signature schemes, are described in the settings of the domain of inte-
gers Z Many aspects of arithmetic over the domain of integers can be
carried out to the domain of Gaussian integers Z[], the set of all com-
plex numbers of the form + , where  and  are integers, and to the
domain of polynomials over …nite …elds  []. Recently, the classical
signature schemes were modi…ed in many directions in these domains.
El-Kassar et al. [7] modi…ed the ElGamal signature scheme from its
classical settings of the domain of natural integers to the domain of
Gaussian integers by extending the arithmetic needed for the modi…-
cations to the domains. Similar extensions to the domain  [] was
given by El-Kassar and Haraty in [3] and [4]. Haraty et al. [8] and [9]
gave a comparative study of the extended ElGamal signature scheme
algorithms. A modi…cation of Rabin signature scheme to polynomial
rings over …nite …elds was given in [6]. In [5], two extensions of the
RSA signature scheme in the domain of Gaussian and the domain of
polynomials over …nite …elds were presented. It was pointed out that
the extended algorithms require a little additional computational e¤ort
than the classical one and accomplish much greater security.
In this paper, we compare and evaluate the classical and modi…ed
RSA algorithms. We investigate the issues of complexity, e¢ciency
and reliability by running the programs with di¤erent sets of data.
Moreover, these di¤erent algorithms will be compared. In addition,
implementation of an attack algorithm will be presented.This is done
by applying certain mathematical concepts to …nd the private key .
After …nding the key, it will be easy to sign the message. A study will
be done using the results of running the attack algorithm to compare
the security of the classical and modi…ed signature scheme algorithms.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes
the classical technique of RSA signature scheme. Then, we present
the modi…cations done on RSA signature scheme. In section 3, we
deal with the attack algorithm. In section 4, a testing procedure is
used to evaluate the classical and modi…ed algorithms. Also, the attack
programs are conducted to test the complexity, e¢ciency and reliability
of the di¤erent modi…ed algorithms and compare them to the classical
one. A conclusion is drawn in section 5.
2. Classical and Modified RSA Signature Scheme
The classical and modi…ed RSA signature schemes are described in
this section. Algorithms and examples are given. These algorithms
will be implemented to evaluate and compare the various methods in
section 5.
2.1. Classical RSA Signature Scheme. In  signature scheme,
entity  generates the public-key by …rst generating two large random
odd primes  and , each roughly of the same size, and computing the
modulus  =  and Euler phi-function () = ( ¡ 1)( ¡ 1) see
[11]. Entity  then selects the exponent  to be any random integer in
the interval (1, ()) such that gcd( ()) = 1. Using the extended
Euclidean algorithm for integers, entity  …nds the exponent  which
is the unique integer (1 ()) relatively prime to () such that  ´
1(mod()). Hence, the public-key is the pair ( ) and 0 private-
key is the triplet (  )
The signature is generated by A as follows. First, entity A computes
the redundancy function of the message  which is e = () such
that () 2 Z and also computes
 ´ e(mod)
Finally, A sends the signature  to entity B.
The signature is validated by B as follows. B obtains A’s authentic
public key ( ), computes
e ´ (mod )
and rejects the signature if e 2  (image of ). Finally, B recovers
 by computing ¡1(e)
Algorithm 1. RSA Signature Scheme:
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(1) Find two large primes  and  and compute their product  =
.
(2) Find an integer  that is relatively prime to () = (¡1)(¡1).
(3) Compute  from  ´ 1(mod ()).
(4) Broadcast the public key ( ).
(5) Compute the redundancy function of the message  which ise = () such that () 2 Z
(6) Sign the message  using the private-key by applying the rule
 ´ e(mod)
(7) The receiver validate the signature using the rule e ´ (mod ).
Example 1. In order to generate the public-key, entity  selects the
primes  = 852225047and  = 603309029 and then computes the
modulus  =  = 514155065595049363 and the Euler phi-function
() = ( ¡ 1)( ¡ 1) = 514155064139515288. Next,  selects the
exponent  = 231814262079216429 and uses the extended Euclidean al-
gorithm for integers to …nd the exponent  = 387883402970610381 so
that  ´ 1(mod()). Now, the public-key is the pair
( = 514155065595049363  = 231814262079216429)
and 0 private-key is the triplet
( = 852225047  = 603309029  = 387883402970610381)
To sign the message = 1101100100111 ,for simplicity, take () =
 so that  is the identity function. Then, e = (1101100100111) =
1101100100111. A computes  = e( ) = 1101100100111387883402970610381(
514155065595049363) = 502534570854711493 and sends the signature
502534570854711493 to B. B obtains A’s authentic public key (514155065595049363 23181426
computes e =  ( ) = 502534570854711493231814262079216429(
514155065595049363) = 1101100100111 and computes  = ¡1(e) =e = 1101100100111
2.2. RSA Signature Scheme in the Domain of Gaussian Inte-
gers, Z[]. In  signature scheme, entity  generates the public-key
by …rst generating two large random Gaussian primes ,  and com-
putes  =  The Gaussian primes of [] up to multiples of §1 and
§ see [10], are of the form: i)  = 1+ ; ii)  = +  and  = ¡ ,
where  =  ¢  = 2 + 2 is an odd prime integer of the form 4 + 1;
iii) , where  is an odd prime integer of the form 4 + 3. If  and 
are selected to be of the form 1 and 2 then the modi…ed scheme is
equivalent to the classical one, see [5]. If  and  are selected to be of
the form  and  then  can be easily factored. Hence,  and  are
selected to be odd integers of the form 4+3. Next, entity  computes
5() = ()() = (2¡1)(2¡1) where () is Euler phi-function in
Z[], see [1]. It selects a random integer  such that 1    () and
 is relatively prime to (). Then, entity  …nds the unique integer
 such that 1    () and  is relatively prime to () such that
 ´ 1(mod()). ’s public-key is
( )
and ’s private-key is
(  ).
Represent the message as a number  chosen from the complete
residue system modulo   = f + j0 ·  ·  ¡ 1 0 ·  ·
 ¡ 1gAfter computing the redundancy function of the message 
which is e = ()A computes the signature  = e( ) and sends
it to B. To verify the signature sent by A, B gets A’s public key ( ),
computes the message representative e as e = ( ) and …nally
applies veri…cation process to e to recover 
We note that the message space is enlarged so that its order is the
square of that of the classical case. Also, the range for the public
exponent  is enlarged by more than the square of that of the classical
case.
In the following we provide three algorithms describing the 
signature scheme over the domain of Gaussian integers. First, entity A
generates the public and private keys by doing the following.
Algorithm 2. (Key generation for the RSA Gaussian signature)
(1) Generating two distinct large random Gaussian primes  and
, each roughly the same size.
(2) Computing  =  and () = (2 ¡ 1)(2 ¡ 1)
(3) Selecting a random integer , 1    () such that ( ()) =
1
(4) Computing the multiplicative inverse  of  such that  ´
1(mod) using the extended Euclidean algorithm over the do-
main of Gaussian integers.
(5) Publishing the pair ( ) as the public key, and keeping  as the
private key.
To generate a signature of a message,entity A should do the follow-
ing.
Algorithm 3. (Signature generation of RSA Gaussian signature)
(1) Represent the message as  chosen from the complete residue
system modulo  
(2) Compute e = () where e 2 
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(3) Compute  = e ()
(4) Output  as the signature to B.
To verify the signature of the message  entity B should do the
following
Algorithm 4. (Signature veri…cation of RSA Gaussian signature)
(1) Obtain A’s authentic public key ( ) 
(2) Recover e ´ ( )
(3) Verify that e 2  , otherwise reject the signature.
(4) Recover  = ¡1( e)
Example 2. (RSA Gaussian Signature Scheme with Small Parame-
ters)
Public-Key Generation: Let  = 91939 and  = 69383 be two Gauss-
ian primes of the form 4 + 3. Compute the product  =  =
6379003637 and () = (919392¡1)(693832¡1) = 40691687387592447360.
Entity  chooses  = 25600002082007742863 such that gcd( ()) = 1
and 1    (). Using the extended Euclidean algorithm for inte-
gers,  …nds  = 33899823343652452847 such that  ´ 1(mod ()).
Hence, 0s public-key is the pair
( = 6379003637  = 25600002082007742863)
and 0s private-key is the triplet
( = 91939  = 69383  = 33899823343652452847).
Signature Generation: To sign the message  = 320177 + 147, for
simplicity, take () =  so that  is the identity function so e =
(320177 + 147) = 320177 + 147 . Afterwards, A computes
 = e = (320177 + 147)33899823343652452847
´ 3059266386 + 5412724259(mod 6379003637)
Finally, A sends the signature to B.
Signature Veri…cation :To validate the signature, B obtains …rst A’s
authentic public key ( = 6379003637  = 25600002082007742863)
Then, B computes
e ´  (mod ) = 3059266386 + 541272425925600002082007742863 (6379003637)
= 320177 + 147
Finally, B computes  = ¡1(e) = 320177 + 147 .
7The following are some of the advantages of the RSA scheme in
Z[]. First, generating two primes  and  in the form 4 + 3 in both
the classical and the modi…ed methods requires the same amount of
e¤ort. Second, the modi…ed method provides more security than the
classical method since the number of elements that can be chosen from
to represent the message  are about the square of those used in the
classical case.Therefore, we deduce that the extended RSA over the
domain Z[] provides an extension to the range of chosen messages,
which make trials more complicated. The computations involved in
the modi…ed method do not require computational procedures that are
di¤erent from those of the classical method.
2.3. RSA Signature Scheme over Quotient Rings of Polyno-
mials over Finite Fields. Let  be a prime number and let () and
() be two distinct irreducible polynomials in Z[] the domain of
polynomials over the …nite …eld Z, where () is of degree  and ()
is of degree . Let () = ()(). The polynomials () and ()
should be selected so that factoring () = ()() is computationally
infeasible. The quotient ring Z[] h()i is …nite of order  where
 = +  is the degree of () It is well known that the quotient ring
Z[] h()i is the direct sum of Z[] h()i and Z[] h()i, that
is
Z[] h ()i »= Z[]h()i ©
Z[]
h()i .
Its group of units (Z[] h()i) is the direct product of groups of
units (Z[] h()i) and  (Z[] h()i), that is
(Z[] h()i »= 
µ
Z[]
h()i
¶
£ 
µ
Z[]
h()i
¶
.
Since () and () are irreducible, the quotient rings
Z[]
h()i and
Z[]
h()i are …nite …elds of order 
 and  respectively. Hence, the
groups  (Z[] h()i) and  (Z[] h()i) are cyclic with orders
(()) =  ¡ 1 and (()) =  ¡ 1 respectively, so that ( ()) =
(¡1)(¡1). We provide the algorithms of the extended RSA signa-
ture over polynomials. First, entity A generates the public and private
keys by doing the following.
Algorithm 5. (Key generation for RSA signature over polynomials)
(1) Generating an odd prime  two distinct monic irreducible poly-
nomials () and () over Z.
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(2) Computing () = ()()
(3) Computing the order of (Z[]  () ) which is (()) =
( ¡ 1)( ¡ 1)
(4) Selecting a random integer  where 1    (()) such that
gcd( (())) = 1
(5) Using the Euclidean algorithm for integers to …nd the unique
multiplicative inverse  of e with respect to (()) such that
1    (()) and  ´ 1(mod (()))
(6) Publishing the key ( () ) and keeping  as private key.
To generate a signature on a message, entity A should do the follow-
ing.
Algorithm 6. (Signature generation of RSA signature over polynomi-
als)
(1) Represent the message as a polynomial () in the complete
residue system modulo () in Z[]
(2) Compute e() = (()), as a polynomial in the complete
residue system modulo () in Z[]
(3) Use the private key  to compute () = (e())(mod ())
(4) Output () as signature of ().
To verify the signature () and recover the real message(), entity
B should do the following.
Algorithm 7. (Signature veri…cation of RSA over polynomials)
(1) Obtain A’s public key ( () )
(2) Compute e() =  (mod())
(3) Verify that e() 2  otherwise reject the signature.
(4) Recover () = ¡1(()) where ¡1 is the inverse of the
Redundancy function.
Example 3. (RSA Signature Scheme over Polynomials with small pa-
rameters)
Public-Key Generation: Let  = 389. Entity  chooses the two
irreducible polynomials () = 2+376+43 and () = 3+3842+
3+10 in Z389[]. Reducing the polynomial () = ()() in Z389[]
and computing ( ())  gets  () = 5 + 3714 + 1113 + 1452 +
388+41 and (()) = (3893¡1)(3892¡1) = 8907280505760.Entity 
then chooses the integer  = 95561135039 such that gcd( ( ()) = 1
and 1    ( ()). Using the extended Euclidean algorithm for
integers,  …nds  = 5878808345759 satisfying  ´ 1(mod( ())).
Hence, ’s public-key is
( = 389 () = 5+3714+1113+1452+388+41  = 95561135039).
9and ’s private-key is
( = 5878808345759 () = 3+3842+3+10 () = 2+376+43).
Signature Generation: Choose () = 1 + 3+ 2 and assume that
the redundancy function is the identity function (for simplicity). Thus,e() = 1 + 3+ 2 . Afterwards, A computes
() = () = (1 + 3+ 2)5878808345759
´ 1724 + 863 + 2652 + 59+ 177(mod  ())
and sends () to B.
Signature Veri…cation: To validate the signature, B computes
e() = () = (1724 + 863 + 2652 + 59+ 177)95561135039
´ 1 + 3+ 2(mod ()).
So, e() = 1 + 3 + 2 2  Hence, () = ¡1(1 + 3 + 2) =
1 + 3+ 2
The security of the RSA signature scheme is based on the intractabil-
ity of both the integer factorization problem and the RSA problem.
Various attack schemes have been studied in the literature as well as
appropriate measures to counteract these threats. Given the public-
key, to forge the signature, a passive adversary must solve the RSA
problem. There is no known e¢cient algorithm for this problem. One
possible approach which an adversary could employ is to …nd the pri-
vate key. In order to attack any protocol that uses the RSA signature
scheme by …nding its private key, the factorization problem must be
solved …rst. After factorization, the RSA problem could be solved by
computing the value of Euler phi-function, and then …nding the private
exponent  using the extended Euclidean algorithm for integers. Once
 is found, the signature can be forged.
On the other hand, if the classical method is used and an adversary
could somehow compute , then  can e¢ciently be factored as follows,
see [11]. Since  ´ 1(mod()), there is an integer  such that ¡1 =
(). Hence, by Euler theorem, ¡1 ´ 1(mod) for all  such that
gcd( ) = 1. Write ¡ 1 = 2, where  is an odd integer. It can be
shown that 2
¡1 is not congruent to either §1 modulo  for at least
half of all integers  with gcd( ) = 1. If  is such an integer, then
a non-trivial factor of  is gcd(2
¡1 ¡ 1 ). This shows that in the
classical case, the  problem and the integer factorization problem
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are computationally equivalent. It is not known if this remains true for
the modi…ed schemes.
In the next section we evaluate the various RSA signature schemes
by recovering the private key using the software package Mathematica.
We illustrate the attack schemes in the following example.
Example 4. (Attacking the RSA signature scheme). Assume that the
public key is: ( = 221806263006661919  = 39786855994835377).
To …nd the private key, we use the built-in Mathematica functions
FactorInteger and PowerMod. The prime factors  and  are ob-
tained from the output of [221806263006661919] which
is ff315841909 1g f702269891 1gg. Hence,  = 315841909 and  =
702269891 Next, we calculate () = ( ¡ 1)( ¡ 1) = (315841909 ¡
1)(702269891¡1) = 404098131692231616. The exponent  = 279550294187496277
is the output of [39786855994835377¡1 404098131692231616]
The private key is ( = 315841909  = 702269891  = 279550294187496277).
3. Testing and Evaluation
In this section, we compare and evaluate the di¤erent classical and
modi…ed signature schemes by showing the implementation of the sig-
nature schemes’ algorithms with their running results. Also, we test the
security of the algorithms by implementing di¤erent attack algorithms
to crack the encrypted messages. All this is done using Mathemat-
ica 5.0 as a programming language and an acer computer with Intel
Pentium M715 processor, 1.5 GHZ CPU and 256 MB DDRAM.
3.1. RSA based Algorithms. Using Mathematica 5.0 functions and
an additional abstract algebra library, we have written programs for
the following algorithms:
(1) Classical RSA.
(2) RSA with Gaussian integers.
(3) RSA with polynomials over a …nite …eld.
After running the programs, it was clear that these programs have
applied the RSA signature scheme in the correct way. All the programs
have generated a public and private key with di¤erent mathematical
concepts. Then a message is signed using the signature scheme and is
sent to a veri…cation procedure which returned the original message.
The classical and Gaussian schemes were tested using the same public-
key. The average running time of several runs using 50, 100, 200, 250
and 300-digit primes are given in tables 1 and 2. The public-key was
generated by randomly selecting odd integers having a given number
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of digits and of the form 4 + 3 The odd integers were tested for pri-
mality using the built-in Mathematica function  until a prime
is found.
Size of primes Classical RSA
Public-Key Signature Veri…cation
50¡  01341 0002 0006
100¡  13801 0011 00151
200¡  42913 00471 00851
250¡  57312 00923 01374
300¡  73706 0144 02074
Table 1. Running time in seconds: Classical RSA.
Size of primes RSA with Gaussian integers
Public-Key Signature Veri…cation
50¡  01341 00912 0097
100¡  13801 0025 0032
200¡  42913 01101 01513
250¡  57312 01883 02595
300¡  73706 03035 04238
Table 2. Running time in seconds: Gaussian integers.
To evaluate RSA algorithms using polynomials, we ran programs for
various values of the prime  and degree of the irreducible polynomi-
als. The average running time of several runs are listed in table 3.
The public-key was generated using the built-in Mathematica function
[  ]
RSA Using polynomials
Prime  Degree  Public-Key Signature Veri…cation
 = 2 2 ·  · 10 00331 00161 00331
21 ·  · 30 17188 09222 16863
50 ·  · 60 156215 88147 17211
 = 101 2 ·  · 10 1429 03365 04305
11 ·  · 20 8992 31823 553
21 ·  · 30 451559 13792 1421275
Table 3. Running time in seconds: RSA using polynomials.
Comparing these algorithms, we conclude the following:
1. All programs are reliable; they can sign ,verify and return any
message.
2. The running time for the signature/veri…cation algorithms is neg-
ligible in the classical and Gaussian cases. In the polynomial case the
12 RAMZI A. HARATY¤, A. N. EL-KASSAR¤¤, AND BILAL M. SHEBARO¤
time for the signature/veri…cation algorithms becomes signi…cant for
large primes and irreducible polynomials with large degree.
3. The complexity for the three programs depends on the com-
plexity of generating the public-key. Thus, the classical and Gaussian
algorithms are equivalent since their public-key generation algorithms
are identical when restricting the choice of primes to those of the form
4+3 The Gaussian method is therefore recommended since the mod-
i…ed method provides an extension to the message space and the public
exponent range.
4. The public-key generation algorithm using polynomials requires
the search for irreducible polynomials. The Mathematica built-in algo-
rithm for generating irreducible polynomials appears to be ine¢cient
as  becomes very large and the degree of the polynomial increases.
3.2. Attack Algorithm. In order to attack any protocol that uses
the RSA public key signature scheme by …nding its private key, the
factorization problem must be solved …rst. To test the security of the
algorithms, we implemented attack schemes applied to the classical and
modi…ed signature scheme algorithms. For the classical and Gaussian
algorithms, we generated a public key using primes of various sizes.
The attack was conducted using the Mathematica built-in function
 to recover the prime factors. The Euler phi-function
was then computed. Finally, the private exponent was obtained. The
average running time of several runs are listed in table 4.
Classical RSA
Digits of  &  20 22 24 26 30
Time 1406 43983 263238 650656 94245
Table 4. Attack time in seconds: Classical RSA.
For the RSA algorithms using polynomials, we generated a public-
key using a prime  of various sizes and irreducible polynomials  ()
and () of di¤erent degrees . The attack was conducted by factoring
() using the built-in function [mod¡  ] to recover
the irreducible factors. The Euler phi-function was then computed.
Finally, the private exponent was obtained. The average running time
of several runs are listed in table 5.
RSA algorithms using polynomials
Digits of  5 5 10 22
Degree  10 ·  · 11 12 ·  · 13 5 ·  · 6 2 ·  · 3
Time 2373 2954 0651 0231
Table 5. Attack time in seconds: RSA algorithms using polynomials.
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After running these attack algorithms, we observed the following:
1. All the attack programs are reliable so that they can sign any
message by …nding the private key.
2. Attacking the classical and Gaussian RSA algorithms is easy if
we are dealing with small prime numbers. However, when it comes
to 100-digit prime numbers or higher, it needs about many computers
working in parallel processing to compute the prime factorization of
the multiplication of two 100-digit prime numbers.
3. Attacking the RSA polynomial algorithm becomes more di¢cult
as the size of  or the degree of the irreducible polynomials become
larger.
4. Conclusion
In this work, we presented the classic RSA signature scheme and two
of its modi…cations, namely, the RSA signature scheme in the domain
of Gaussian integers, [] and over quotient rings of polynomials over
…nite …elds. We implemented these algorithms and tested their e¢-
ciency, reliability, and security. The results obtained showed that all
the algorithms applied the RSA signature scheme correctly and gen-
erated public and private key using di¤erent mathematical concepts.
Messages were then signed using the signature scheme and were sent
in encrypted form to a veri…cation procedure which validated the sig-
nature and returned the original messages.
We also built attack scenarios directly aimed at solving the factor-
ization problem. We modi…ed the RSA attack algorithm to handle
the modi…ed algorithms.We observed that the Gaussian method is pre-
ferred since it is as secure as the classical one but provides an extension
to the message space and to the signature exponent range.
As for future work, we plan to compare and evaluate the e¢ciency
of the modi…ed algorithms using very large numbers by using parallel
computing techniques. We plan to run the programs in parallel on
many computers and split the complex mathematical calculations be-
tween these computers. We plan to write a function that is capable
of …nding any random irreducible equation with respect to a speci…c
prime number . We also plan to apply the modi…ed algorithms in
many …elds such as database, communications and network security.
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